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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
White Consolidated Industries, Inc. ("WCI") appeals from 
an order entered by the District Court after a ten-day bench 
trial granting judgment in favor of Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") on counts one and four of 
its complaint and, accordingly, holding WCI liable for 
certain unfunded pension obligations pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 
SS 1362 and 1369.1 We conclude that the District Court did 
not err in determining that WCI was liable under 
section 1369 and will affirm on that basis. 
 
We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. PBGC's complaint sought only declaratory relief as to WCI's liability. 
JA 30. The amount of WCI's liability to PBGC is being resolved in a 
separate administrative proceeding. 
 
                                2 
  
conclusions of law. Express Services, Inc. v. Careers 
Express Staffing Services, 176 F.3d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 1999). 
We review findings of fact for clear error, and"due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, North Carolina , 470 U.S. 
564, 573 - 574 (1985). Likewise, we reviewfindings of 
ultimate fact for clear error. See ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 157 F.3d 231, 245, n25 
(3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Facts 
 
WCI, a home appliance manufacturer, became concerned 
in the early 1980s about the profitability and viability of a 
group of its divisions engaged in the steel business, the 
Blaw Knox companies ("BK businesses"). Based on the 
recommendations of an outside consulting firm, WCI 
unsuccessfully sought to sell or liquidate the BK 
businesses with the intent of retaining the grossly 
underfunded pension liabilities associated with those 
businesses. Efforts to market and sell the BK businesses 
initially were unavailing. By early 1985, WCI had identified 
a potential buyer, Joseph Cvengros. Cvengros proposed 
that, instead of offering cash, his company would assume 
the unfunded pension plans of the BK businesses with the 
intent of terminating the pension plans either immediately 
before or after the deal closed. This transaction was never 
consummated. Ultimately, WCI commenced negotiations 
with and found a buyer in Robert Tomsich, a long-time 
acquaintance of a WCI executive, and, in September 1985, 
WCI closed a deal with Blaw Knox Corp. ("BKC"), a thinly 
capitalized corporation established by Tomsich for the 
purpose of acquiring the BK businesses. The parties and 
their lawyers engaged in extensive negotiations leading up 
to the consummation of this transaction, and WCI 
internally considered several acquisition scenarios involving 
assumptions of differing amounts of pension obligations. 
The history of the negotiations discloses that WCI was 
aware that legislation then pending in Congress could 
render it liable for the unfunded pension benefits if the 
plans terminated within five years after the closing of the 
deal, while, at the same time, projections for the steel 
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industry generally, and BKC's future specifically, looked 
bleak. 
 
The purchase and sale agreement ultimately provided, 
inter alia, that BKC would pay nothing for the businesses, 
but would assume the BK business pension liabilities. JA 
1306, 1340.2 Yet, the agreement as crafted by WCI took 
steps to ensure that the pension plans would not falter 
before 1990, five years after the deal closed. WCI was 
required to contribute $20 million to the BK pension trusts 
in five equal annual installments, through September of 
1990. JA 1328-1329. The agreement also required that 
BKC satisfy the minimum pension funding obligations 
"through and including the plan year beginning in 1990." 
JA 1344. WCI took a security interest in BKC's assets to 
secure BKC's obligation to assume the underfunded 
liabilities. BKC also was required to obtain a letter of credit 
in favor of WCI, on which WCI could draw in the event a 
claim or demand was brought against WCI with respect to 
the assumed BK plans. JA 1356-1359. WCI would reduce 
the letter of credit for the benefit of BKC over a period of 
five and a half years if there were no demands asserted 
against WCI with respect to the BK plans. BKC agreed to 
indemnify and hold WCI harmless for all benefits under the 
assumed plans, the minimum funding obligations of the 
plans, and termination of the assumed plans. JA 1343. 
WCI required that BKC submit financial information over 
the following five-year period as well. 
 
In February 1992, after the five-year period ended, BKC 
failed and the largest of the BK pension plans was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties disagree on the estimated unfunded pension liabilities of 
the BK businesses at the time of the WCI-BKC transaction. The District 
Court credited the $74.6 million estimate of PBGC's expert. Slip. Op. at 
24. The District Court found that this estimate was consistent with 
WCI's estimate from the fourth quarter of 1984, $71.5 million, which 
was calculated for purposes of establishing a discontinued operations 
reserve. Slip. Op. at 25. The District Court essentially discredited WCI's 
later and lower estimates of the unfunded liability, which were calculated 
using different assumptions, e.g., $46.8 million as of January 1, 1985, 
and $40.2 million as of July 31, 1985. Slip. Op. at 27-29. Resolving this 
appeal does not require that we reconcile thesefigures. 
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terminated, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. S 4042(a), with 
substantial underfunded obligations.3 
 
Procedural History 
 
PBGC filed a complaint to recover the unfunded 
obligations from WCI under two theories: predecessor 
liability under 29 U.S.C. S 1369 and as a sham transaction 
under 29 U.S.C. S 1362. On September 11, 1992, the 
District Court dismissed all five counts of PBGC's amended 
complaint. JA 54.4 On appeal, we reversed in part, stating: 
 
       We hold that the PBGC has stated a legally sufficient 
       claim under 29 U.S.C. S 1369 (1988). Section 1369's 
       requirement that a transaction "become [ ] effective" 
       within five years of the plan termination is met because 
       a transaction does not take effect until the previous 
       plan sponsor stops making substantial payments to 
       the pension plans. On the other hand, because section 
       1369 specifically addresses predecessor liability and 
       applies to this transaction, we will not read an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In its amended complaint, PBGC estimated this unfunded liability to 
be $81,600,000. JA 30, 46. 
 
4. The District Court found that PBGC failed to state a claim that WCI 
was a contributing sponsor under the sham transaction theory in count 
one because the Court saw "no reason why ridding oneself of an 
unprofitable operation serves no legitimate business purpose." JA 62 
(Slip. Op. at 9). The District Court dismissed count two, which sought to 
hold WCI liable under section 1362 based on the fact that that BKC 
defaulted on its security agreement with WCI, because "[f]or WCI to have 
the right to possession of BKC's assets, a [p]lan termination must exist, 
a condition over which WCI had no control" prior to 1992. JA 64 (Slip. 
Op. at 11). The District Court dismissed count three, based on an 
implied termination/predecessor liability theory, because even if it 
accepted the validity of that theory, the Court did not believe it 
extended 
to circumstances in which the buyer remains in business and the plans 
are not terminated within five years after the sale. JA 68 (Slip. Op. at 
15). Count four, a section 1369 count, was also rejected based on the 
District Court's view that WCI was neither an employer nor a plan 
sponsor after September of 1985. JA 71 (Slip. Op. at 18). Because the 
District Court found that WCI's individual payments to the BK plans 
were not separate transactions to evade liability within the meaning of 
section 1369, the District Court dismissed countfive as well. JA 71-72 
(Slip. Op. at 18-19). 
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       unexpressed predecessor liability rule into 29 U.S.C. 
       S 1362 (1988). Additionally, the PBGC's claim that the 
       transaction at issue is a sham also survives the motion 
       to dismiss. We therefore will affirm in part and reverse 
       in part the order of the district court, and remand for 
       further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White Consolidated 
Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1194 (3d Cir. 1993) 
("WCI 1"). 
 
On remand, and after a ten-day bench trial, PBGC 
prevailed on counts one and four of its complaint. 5 In a 
comprehensive ninety-page opinion, the District Court 
found that WCI was liable under section 1369, the express 
predecessor liability provision. The District Court also 
determined that the WCI-BKC sale transaction should be 
disregarded as a sham for purposes of holding WCI liable 
as a contributing sponsor under section 1362. 
 
WCI challenges several aspects of the District Court's 
decision. WCI contends that it is not subject to liability 
under section 1369 because the WCI-BKC transaction 
closed prior to section 1369's effective date. And, even if 
section 1369 were applicable, WCI argues, the District 
Court misapplied that provision. WCI also urges that the 
District Court erred in finding that the WCI-BKC 
transaction was a sham and thus WCI is liable as a 
contributing sponsor under section 1362. Because we base 
our holding on section 1369, we first turn to that issue. 
 
Section 1369; Treatment of Transactions to Evade 
Liability 
 
Section 1369(a), "Treatment of transactions to evade 
liability," provides in pertinent part: 
 
       If a principal purpose of any person in entering into any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Count one asserts that the transfer was a"sham" designed to allow 
WCI to avoid pension liabilities, and thus WCI should retain liability as 
a contributing sponsor under 29 U.S.C. S 1362. JA 47. Count four 
asserts that a principal purpose of WCI's transaction with BKC was to 
evade underfunded pension obligations, making WCI liable under 29 
U.S.C. S 1369, as well as under section 1362. JA 49. 
 
                                6 
  
       transaction is to evade liability to which such person 
       would be subject under this subtitle [29 U.S.C. S 1361 
       et seq.] and the transaction becomes effective within 
       five years before the termination date of the termination 
       on which such liability would be based, then such 
       person . . . shall be subject to liability under this 
       subtitle [29 U.S.C. S 1361 et seq.] in connection with 
       such termination as if such person were a contributing 
       sponsor of the terminated plan as of the termination 
       date. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 1369(a) (emphasis added). Congress expressly 
provided that section 1369, which was enacted in April of 
1986, "shall apply with respect to transactions becoming 
effective on or after January 1, 1986." Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
S 11013(b), 100 Stat. 261 (1986) (emphasis added). 
 
Applicability of Section 1369 to WCI-BKC Transaction 
 
In WCI 1, we considered whether section 1369 applied to 
WCI in view of the fact that the BK plan termination 
occurred more than five years after the closing of the WCI- 
BKC transaction. Noting that the statute speaks in terms of 
when a transaction "becomes effective," not when a 
transaction closes, we rejected the notion that the 
transaction necessarily became effective on the closing 
date. Instead, we determined that a "transaction does not 
become effective for purposes of section 1369 until the 
company that transferred a pension plan no longer makes 
substantial pension contributions." WCI 1, 998 F.2d at 
1199. Thus, we concluded that the WCI-BKC transaction 
did not become effective until 1990, when WCI ceased 
making annual contributions to the BK pension plans, and 
the termination fell within the requisite five-year period. 
Given our holding that the WCI-BKC transaction became 
effective in 1990, we correspondingly held that section 1369 
applies to the WCI-BKC transaction, which became effective 
after the effective date of the statute. Id. at 1199, n. 2.6 In 
light of our conclusion, the District Court held that it was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We applied this holding in a companion opinion issued on the same 
day that WCI 1 was decided, Blaw Knox Retirement Income Plan v. White 
Consolidated Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1185 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, the 
BK pension plans had sued WCI alleging, inter alia, section 1362 and 
1369 liability, and the District Court had dismissed the complaint. Citing 
and adopting the rationale of WCI 1, we held that the BK plans stated 
a legally sufficient claim for relief in Count V of their complaint under 
section 1369 and, accordingly, reversed the dismissal of that Count. Id. 
at 1187. 
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bound by WCI 1 to apply section 1369 to the WCI-BKC 
transaction. Slip. Op. at 80. 
 
WCI argues on appeal that the District Court was not 
bound by our previous ruling, that it adopted an overbroad 
reading of the WCI 1 holding, and that it erred by 
"retroactively" applying section 1369 to the WCI-BKC 
transaction, which closed on September 27, 1985. WCI 
contends that WCI 1 did not actually determine that section 
1369 is applicable here because our statement on this 
issue was relegated to a short footnote, was devoid of legal 
analysis, and ran afoul of the Supreme Court's dictates 
with respect to when a statute has retroactive effect. Even 
if WCI 1 is law of the case on this issue, WCI contends, we 
should re-examine the application of section 1369 to this 
transaction in light of the supervening change in the law of 
retroactive application of statutes effected by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. , 511 U.S. 
244 (1994). See generally Mathews v. Kidder Peabody & 
Co., 161 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 1998) (setting forth steps to 
determine whether statute should be applied retroactively).7 
 
We are persuaded that our statement in WCI 1 regarding 
the applicability of section 1369 to the WCI-BKC 
transaction is the law of the case. Likewise, we hold that 
the District Court correctly recognized that our ruling in 
WCI 1, footnote and all, dictated the application of section 
1369 to the WCI-BKC transaction. We reject WCI's 
contention that the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf 
requires that we re-examine the law of the case. This 
argument might have merit if, in WCI 1, we had analyzed 
the statute's retroactivity in a way now forbidden by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Mathews summarized the framework for retrospective application of 
statutes, synthesized from Landgraf and Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 
(1997), as follows: 
 
       (1) look for an express command in either direction; (2) discern 
       whether there is congressional intent to only apply a statute 
       prospectively; (3) analyze the statute for retroactive effect; and 
(4) 
       look for clear intent to apply the statute retrospectively (if it 
has 
       retroactive effect) or simply use normal rules of construction to 
       determine the statute's temporal reach. 
 
       Mathews, 161 F.3d at 161. 
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Landgraf, making Landgraf a supervening change in the 
law with respect to this issue. See In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 
591, 595 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing Landgraf as "the 
landmark case which establishes the analytical framework 
governing retroactivity issues"); Public Interest Research 
Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Magnesium Electron, Inc., 123 
F.3d 111, 116-117 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that a 
supervening change of law is a type of extraordinary 
circumstance that would justify reconsideration of an issue 
previously decided). However, that is not the situation. In 
WCI 1, we applied section 1369 prospectively, not 
retroactively, because, based on our interpretation of the 
phrases "becomes effective" and "becoming effective" we 
held that the event triggering the application of the statute 
did not occur until 1990, well after the statute's effective 
date. Accordingly, we have no occasion to re-examine the 
law of the case based on principles of retroactivity. 
Section 1369, by its terms as we have construed them, 
applies to the WCI-BKC transaction. 
 
A Principal Purpose to Evade 
 
Turning to the merits, WCI challenges the District Court's 
substantive application of section 1369 to the WCI-BKC 
transaction. In particular, WCI contends that, in assessing 
whether a principal purpose of the transaction was to evade 
pension liability, the District Court erroneously focused on 
after-the-fact assessments of BKC's economic viability and 
value, rather than relying on evidence of WCI's purpose, 
including its beliefs about the amount of pension liabilities 
and BKC's ability to pay them at the time of closing. As will 
be explained below, we agree with WCI, albeit for different 
reasons, that the District Court's reliance on after-the-fact 
objective assessments of BKC's economic health did not 
comport with the requirements of section 1369. However, 
this conclusion does not in any way compel reversal 
because we find adequate evidence, as did the District 
Court, that a principal purpose of WCI's sale was to evade 
these obligations. 
 
Relying on statements in WCI 1, the District Court noted 
that section 1369 was a codification of the implicit 
predecessor liability theory of section 1362, which was 
enunciated for the first and only time in one district court 
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opinion, In re Consol. Lit. Concerning International 
Harvester's Disposition of Wisconsin Steel, 681 F. Supp. 512 
(N.D. Ill. 1988) ("International Harvester "). Adopting the test 
used in International Harvester to assess implied 
termination/predecessor liability under section 1362, the 
District Court proposed that the finding of liability under 
section 1369 should proceed as follows: 
 
       The first step is an objective analysis which requires 
       the court to make an initial determination of whether 
       a transferred plan remained viable for five years under 
       a new sponsor, beginning from the time that the 
       predecessor sponsor no longer makes substantial 
       pension contributions. If the answer is yes, the 
       analysis ends here and no liability may be imposed 
       upon the predecessor sponsor. If the plans do 
       terminate within a five year period, the court must 
       determine on an objective basis whether the new 
       sponsor lacked a reasonable chance of meeting the 
       pension obligations. The court must then examine the 
       predecessor sponsor's subjective intent at the time of 
       entering into the transaction and determine whether a 
       principal purpose of entering into the transaction was 
       to evade pension obligations. . . . If a principal purpose 
       of entering into the transaction was to evade pension 
       obligations and the new sponsor lacked a reasonable 
       chance of survival, then the predecessor sponsor is 
       liable for the terminated plans. 
 
Slip. Op. at 85-86 (emphasis added). We submit that the 
portion of the District Court's test that focuses on the 
economic health of the transferee lacks support in the 
language of section 1369. Furthermore, in WCI 1 , we read 
the five-year provision as having replaced the"reasonable 
chance of success" inquiry: 
 
       The second prong of the Harvester test required the 
       plaintiff to prove that the new employer had no 
       reasonable chance of fulfilling the pension obligations 
       it assumed. In its place, Congress substituted the 
       requirement that the plan terminate within five years of 
       the date the transaction became effective . . . . 
       Congress apparently believed that if a plan terminated 
       within five years of being transferred, it was fair to 
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       assume that the new employer did not have a 
       reasonable chance of succeeding at the time of the 
       transfer. Congress also believed that if a plan remained 
       viable for five years under a new sponsor, the previous 
       employer should have the benefit of an irrebuttable 
       presumption that the new sponsor had a reasonable 
       chance of fulfilling the pension obligations it assumed. 
       It is reasonable to assume that Congress viewed the 
       amount of time a pension plan survived after a change 
       of sponsorship as reflective of the economic condition 
       of the new sponsor at the time of the transfer. Using 
       this easily quantifiable surrogate, Congress fashioned a 
       bright line rule. 
 
WCI 1, 998 F.2d at 1199. Based on the plain language of 
section 1369, we hold that section 1369 does not require, 
as an independent element, proof that the new sponsor 
lacked a reasonable chance of succeeding. In reaching this 
conclusion, we do not mean to suggest that evidence of the 
transferee's viability cannot be considered in ascertaining a 
transferor's primary purposes of entering into the 
transaction, but only that it is not an independent 
predicate for section 1369 liability. Accordingly, we need 
not address WCI's specific challenges to the evidence of 
BKC's viability or the District Court's treatment of that 
issue. 
 
The key section 1369 inquiry is whether WCI had"a 
principal purpose" of evading its pension liabilities. We 
conclude that both documentary and testimonial evidence 
amply support the District Court's findings of fact regarding 
WCI's intentions to evade pension liability, and we uphold 
the District Court's legal conclusion that WCI is liable 
under section 1369. As outlined below (and as described in 
WCI 1 in the context of the motion to dismiss), the chain of 
events documented in the record illustrate that evasion of 
WCI's unfunded BK pension liabilities was a principal 
purpose of entering into the WCI-BKC transaction, and 
played a major role in shaping the terms of that 
transaction. 
 
Although WCI had designs on disposing of its 
unprofitable non-core steel industry divisions in 1984, WCI 
started to specifically consider the ramifications of 
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transferring the BK businesses' unfunded pension liabilities 
in early 1985. See, e.g., JA 3437 (February 26, 1985 
memorandum to Ware from Morse regarding the sale of 
certain BK businesses) ("The question as to whether [WCI] 
could have some liability for unfunded pension benefits if 
the new owners were to terminate the plans or end up in 
bankruptcy, is unclear"). 
 
WCI's lawyers researched various theories that PBGC 
could assert to hold WCI accountable for unfunded pension 
liabilities of the BK businesses, including pending 
legislation that imposed contingent liability on a seller for 
at least five years. JA 3458 (April 1, 1985 memorandum to 
WCI - Blaw-Knox file from Draucker); JA 3486 (April 18, 
1985 memorandum to WCI - Blaw-Knox file from Draucker 
re: "Underfunded defined benefit plan - liability of seller") 
(providing more detailed explanation of pending predecessor 
liability legislation with five-year contingent liability period); 
JA 3493 (April 23, 1985 memorandum to Ransom from 
Draucker) (reporting on PBGC's efforts to impose 
predecessor liability for unfunded pension obligations in the 
International Harvester case). These memoranda noted that 
a seller might wish to account for the possibility of 
predecessor liability when structuring a deal with the buyer 
to ensure that these liabilities fall on the buyer. WCI's 
lawyers sent WCI executives information regarding the 
International Harvester litigation. JA 3497 (April 24, 1985 
letter to Ware and Elliot from Draucker). WCI executives 
were aware that PBGC might seek to hold WCI responsible 
under several theories, including some that might have a 
five-year contingent liability period. See, e.g., JA 5315, 
5289 (Hunt deposition). 
 
In a memorandum from April 24, 1985, the day before a 
meeting with Cvengros, WCI's general counsel listed as the 
first subject for discussion regarding the sale as"[D]oes 
purchaser agree generally with Wyatt [WCI's actuary] 
analysis of the unfunded pension liability and retiree 
pension costs," and described that issue as one of the key 
matters for discussion. JA 1151, 1152 (April 24, 1985 
memorandum to Ware, Hunt & Jacobs from Elliot). Also 
listed for discussion was "[W]hat is significance of 
Wisconsin Steel-Harvester litigation on [lawyers'] 
conclusions on residual WCI pension liability?" JA 1151. 
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Consideration of Cvengros' proposal to terminate the BK 
plans directly before or after purchasing the BK businesses 
brought WCI's risk of underfunded pension liability 
exposure sharply into focus. Ransom's file notes from the 
April 25, 1985 Cvengros meeting describe the proposal for 
immediate post-closing termination as a "two-edged sword," 
leaving "very little room for WCI to avoid an International 
Harvester/Wisconsin Steel situation or other possible 
theories of [s]eller liability." JA 1175 (April 28, 1985 
memorandum to file from Ransom, enclosed with April 29, 
1985 letter to Hunt from Ransom). Ransom's handwritten 
notes from the meeting listed as a problem "PBGC-- must 
still get over dumping initially - not necessarilyfive years." 
JA 1165. See also JA 746 - 747 (trial transcript, March 11, 
1997, Ransom). 
 
Alternatively, Cvengros had proposed to terminate the 
plans before the parties consummated the sale, about 
which Ransom's notes state: 
 
       Needless to say, terminating the plans prior to the 
       closing would put WCI squarely on the hook as the 
       employer that maintained the plans at the time of 
       termination and the PBGC would not even have to use 
       International Harvester/Wisconsin Steel principles or 
       any other theory of seller liability. At least if the plans 
       terminate after the closing, WCI has a plausible basis 
       for asserting that it is not responsible for the liabilities. 
 
JA 1176. This deal was abandoned. 
 
The structure of the transaction negotiated with Tomsich 
was different, and to WCI's liking. WCI was to transfer 
most, if not all, of the BK pension liabilities to BKC, and it 
was agreed that the BK plans would not be terminated 
during the following five years, during which time it was 
most likely that WCI would be held contingently liable as a 
predecessor. 
 
Even absent the Cvengros proposal to terminate the BK 
pension plans, WCI was aware that early termination of the 
BK plans was more than a remote possibility. See, e.g., JA 
1208 (June 12, 1985 letter to Hunt from Reynolds of Wyatt, 
WCI's actuary); JA 3580 (June 12, 1985 memorandum to 
WCI file from Reynolds re: meeting with attorney); JA 1165 
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(Ransom's notes from April 25, 1985 meeting) ("still run 
risk of terminating -- at least in first 5 years"); JA 1211 
(Ransom's notes from June 19, 1985 meeting with WCI 
executives) (noting disadvantages of certain deal structures 
in the event that the buyer terminated pension plans early). 
Given this state of affairs, WCI's lawyers were clearly 
working on how to structure the deal so as to minimize 
WCI's unfunded pension liability exposure. See, e.g., JA 
1035 (June 18, 1985 memorandum to Holdt, Smith and 
Ware from Hunt and Elliot re: Disposition of the Blaw Knox 
Companies) ("We will be counseled throughout by Squire, 
Sanders & Dempsey on this matter to minimize our 
exposure . . . . The overall economic benefit of this 
transaction, in our judgment, far outweighs this remote 
risk."). 
 
In the context of discussing pension liabilities, WCI 
executives expressed significant concern "about getting the 
five year period behind them" and "wanted the prior service 
liability to be as low as possible." JA 1205 (June 10, 1985 
memorandum to Tomsich from Nehrig, reporting on 
meeting with Hunt and Ware). WCI's executives understood 
that the "principal economic benefit to WCI" of the 
disposition of the BK businesses was the buyer's 
assumption of unfunded pension liabilities and the 
obligation to provide insurance to certain retirees. JA 1034 
(June 18, 1985 memorandum to Holdt, Smith, and Ware 
from Hunt and Elliot). 
 
Even after WCI had signed a letter of intent with Tomsich 
setting forth the basic parameters of the deal, WCI 
continued to shape the transaction in a way that it believed 
would provide maximum protection from being held 
responsible for the unfunded pension liabilities. 8 When WCI 
commenced its negotiations with Tomsich, it had intended 
to retain at least some of the dedicated pension assets and 
liabilities. WCI consulted with its actuary and counsel on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. WCI's Board of Directors reserved its right to approve the WCI-BKC 
deal in the event that the agreement reflected"more than a $10 million 
adverse variance from the projected $67 million savings from the 
originally booked pre-tax loss relative to the divisions" at issue. JA 
1248 
(Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors, July 30, 1985). 
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the extent to which the buyer -- and not WCI -- would be 
required under the possible scenarios to provide for all 
unfunded pension liabilities in the event that the BK plans 
terminated. See JA 1207-1208 (June 12, 1985 letter to 
Hunt from Reynolds, WCI's actuary re: Blaw Knox pension 
plans - Treatment of the Dedicated Bond Fund). WCI 
ultimately rejected the option that its actuary identified as 
potentially leaving WCI directly liable for certain unfunded 
pension liabilities, and instead required that the 
transaction be structured so that BKC assumed all assets 
and liabilities, including dedicated liabilities, the option 
identified by WCI's actuary as increasing the buyer's 
exposure.9 WCI's executives remained concerned about 
whether the transaction was "outside of sham." JA 166 
(Joint statement of uncontested facts); JA 5287 (Hunt 
deposition). See also JA 1034 (June 18, 1985 memorandum 
to Holdt, Smith, and Ware from Hunt and Elliot) 
(discussing PBGC's assertion of sham against other 
predecessors). 
 
Ransom's notes for a June 19, 1985 meeting indicate the 
advantages of structuring the deal in this fashion, all of 
which relate to the possibility of WCI's evading liability for 
its unfunded pension obligations: 
 
       What do we want Buyer to do with plans? 
 
       A. Maintain plans for at least 5 years? (i.e. until 
       1/1/90?) 
 
       Advantages 
 
       (1) In some ways may look better to PBGC (xc 5 year 
       limit could look like evasion) - Certainly it doesn't look 
       as much like a dumping. 
 
       (2) If Buyer does it, it should take WCI off statutory 
       hook (xc for new legislation). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although the record generally reflects arms-length bargaining for the 
most part, Tomsich apparently was willing to accept less favorable terms 
for BKC because he had limited his own unfunded pension liability 
exposure by owning less than 80% of the acquiring corporation. See, 
e.g., JA 929 (trial transcript, March 14, 1997, Elliot). 
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       . . . 
 
       (5) . . . would not invite PBGC in. . . 
 
JA 1214.10 To maximize its bargaining leverage, WCI was 
discouraged by its attorney from disclosing the deal to 
PBGC ahead of time: 
 
       Any discussions with the PBGC, although they would 
       seem to be desirable, would have to be entered into 
       with the understanding that they could turn out to be 
       so unsatisfactory as to kill the deal. If the deal went 
       forward without discussions with PBGC, any problems 
       with PBGC would then have to be worked out in the 
       context of actual termination of the plan. At that point 
       the situation might be sufficiently cloudy as far as the 
       PBGC is concerned (i.e. they might have to use 
       International Harvester/Wisconsin Steel theories in 
       litigation to recover on its own terms from WCI), that 
       the parties might actually have more leverage in 
       dealing with the PBGC. 
 
JA 1178. See also JA 148 (Joint statement of uncontested 
facts); JA 740 (trial transcript, March 11, 1997, Ransom). 
 
WCI's intent to avoid its unfunded pension obligations 
was hardly lost on other parties and professionals. The 
Minutes of the Metropolitan Credit Committee, BKC's 
lender, describe the situation as follows: 
 
       Another major problem is an unfunded pension health 
       and life liabilities of approximately $61 mm. WCI wants 
       relieved [sic.] from this liability . . . . While the laws are 
       somewhat unclear, WCI feels it could be obligated on 
       the past unfunded pension obligation and health and 
       life liability for up to five years (the PBGC can go after 
       them) if BKC does not fund the required payments 
       annually. 
 
JA 1272, 1274. 
 
Tomsich likewise testified that he was aware WCI was 
concerned about keeping the BK pension plans alive for five 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. A noted disadvantage was that "PBGC might step in anyway and 
initiate terminations." JA 1215. 
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years. JA 573 (trial transcript, March 6, 1997). Although 
WCI did not explain its reasoning to Tomsich directly, 
Tomsich's counsel told him that the concern about the five- 
year period had "something to do with some kind of 
requirement that the liability would disappear afterfive 
years from the seller." Id. 
 
WCI therefore determined that the buyer of the BK 
business should be required to maintain and meet the 
minimum funding obligations for the pension plans until 
1990. JA 1217 - 1218 (Notes from June 19, 1985 meeting 
at WCI); JA 1224 (June 21, 1985 notes to file from 
Reynolds re: meeting with client).11 The deal that WCI 
designed and ultimately consummated, the details of which 
we have already described, infra, was clearly structured to 
keep the underfunded BK pension plans from terminating 
for five years after the deal closed, and to shift as much of 
the unfunded pension responsibility as possible to BKC in 
the event of termination.12 
 
The evidence clearly supports the District Court's 
determination that WCI had a principal purpose of evading 
pension liabilities. WCI was aware of the ways in which it 
might be held liable for its past unfunded pension liabilities 
and took steps to transfer those liabilities and prevent the 
plans from terminating while it still might be held partially 
or fully responsible. Moreover, WCI rejected any deal that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Although WCI offered evidence to provide an alternative explanation 
for their interest in the five-year period, the District Court discredited 
that testimony and found it to be wholly undermined by other 
documentary evidence. See Slip. Op. at 50. We apply a deferential 
standard of review to the District Court's credibility determinations and 
do not overturn the Court's determinations here. 
 
12. The resolution of a post-sale dispute, in which BKC alleged that WCI 
had made misrepresentations about the BK pension liabilities, also is 
telling. In resolving this dispute, Hunt (now working for BKC) noted that 
WCI sought to avoid unwanted PBGC attention. JA 1451-1453 (Hunt's 
handwritten notes from conference call, referring to dispute as "smoking 
gun" that could cause damage to WCI). The formal agreement settling 
the dispute conditioned the settlement on BKC and WCI refraining from 
suggesting that either party had engaged or acquiesced in any action, 
policy, or practice that would constitute a violation of law or policy. JA 
4415, 4417. 
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did not include the transfer of pension liabilities to the 
buyer. This is simply not a case in which a corporation 
sought to transfer pension liabilities as part of a legitimate 
divestiture of unprofitable subsidiaries. Rather, this is a 
case in which the transferor, WCI, sought to use the 
transfer of a group of failing businesses as a means of 
evading the pension liabilities associated with those 
businesses. Had WCI 1 started the five-year clock in 1985 
when the deal closed, rather than in 1990 when WCI 
ceased propping up the pension plans, WCI's plan to evade 
its liability may very well have been successful. We will 
affirm the District Court's judgment that WCI is liable 
under section 1369. 
 
Amount of Liability under Section 1369 
 
WCI raises an additional challenge to the District Court's 
ruling on section 1369, contending, somewhat cryptically, 
that PBGC failed to establish the amount of underfunding 
WCI was liable to pay on the date of the transaction. WCI 
argues, therefore, that the District Court used an erroneous 
and "non-statutory" measure of liability to gauge WCI's 
intent. Brief for Appellant at 51. WCI's argument is based 
on the language of section 1369(a), which states that a 
person is responsible for "the liability to which such person 
would be subject under this subtitle." 29 U.S.C. S 1369(a) 
(emphasis added). In addition to challenging this argument 
on the merits, and asserting that WCI would be liable 
under section 1369 even using WCI's own estimates, PBGC 
alleges that WCI waived this argument by failing to raise it 
at trial or in its proposed conclusions of law after the 
evidence was presented. 
 
In its reply brief, WCI argues that it "contended 
repeatedly in the [D]istrict [C]ourt that the PBGC had failed 
to establish that WCI acted with a principal purpose to 
evade its statutory liability to the PBGC," citing to a portion 
of its proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law that 
it filed May 14, 1997. Reply Brief for Appellant at 28. WCI 
does not refer to, nor can we discern, a proposedfinding 
that asserted or preserved the specific argument that WCI 
now makes regarding proof of the actual amount of liability 
as an element of section 1369. See SA-213 - SA-223.13 If 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Citing Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, WCI also 
argues that the losing party in a non-jury trial is not required to argue 
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this issue was not specifically presented to the District 
Court, we need not address it on appeal.14  
 
Curiously, the District Court did address the need for 
proof of the amount of WCI's liability, although its opinion 
does not frame the question as being dependent on the 
language of section 1369 as WCI now urges. We are left 
with uncertainty as to whether WCI's argument was raised, 
but merely not documented adequately in the record before 
us. Whether WCI waived this issue does not affect our 
holding because we conclude that proof of the actual 
amount of liability is not necessary in this proceeding. As 
WCI essentially recognizes, see Brief for Appellant at 54, 
once it is determined that a person is subject to section 
1369 liability "as if such person were a contributing 
sponsor," the amount of liability should be calculated in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that insufficient evidence exists to support the District Court's findings 
in order to advance that argument on appeal. Reply Brief for Appellant 
at 28. Rule 52(b) provides in pertinent part that"[w]hen findings of fact 
are made in actions tried without a jury, the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the findings may be later questioned whether or not in the 
district court the party raising the question objected to the findings, 
moved to amend them, or moved for partial findings." FED. R. CIV. P. 
52(b). However, we do not read WCI's assertion to be an attack on the 
sufficiency of the evidence, but rather to be an argument that the 
District Court erred by ignoring a specific requirement embedded in 
section 1369. 
 
14. See, e.g., The Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 105 n3 
(3d Cir. 1999) (finding that one of defendants' arguments was waived for 
failure to raise issue in district court); Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf 
Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 524 n6 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
Diamond waived its equitable subrogation argument on appeal because, 
"[a]lthough Diamond claims that it made this argument in its brief 
opposing Gulf Coast's motion for summary judgment . . . our review of 
that brief convinces us that this argument was not fairly raised") (citing 
United States v. Anthony Dell'Aquilla Enters., 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3d Cir. 
1998) (rejecting argument that government did not present prima facie 
case for certain violations because, absent exceptional circumstances, an 
issue not raised in district court will not be heard on appeal)); Keenan 
v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
defendants waived argument that evidence of theirfinancial status is a 
prerequisite to punitive damages because they failed to present the 
argument "with sufficient specificity to alert the district court"). 
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accordance with the procedures for determining liability 
under section 1362. Establishing the amount of liability 
under section 1362 in the first instance, as the District 
Court explained, begins with an administrative -- not 
judicial -- procedure. See Slip. Op. at 88 -91 (citing 19 
C.F.R. 4068.3). Thus, whether or not WCI waived this 
argument, we conclude that the District Court did not err 
when it declined to fix the amount of WCI's liability. 
 
As an alternate ground for liability, the District Court 
also held that the transaction ran afoul of 29 U.S.C. S 1362 
based on the sham transfer doctrine. Having affirmed the 
District Court's finding of WCI's liability under the express 
provision for predecessor liability set forth in section 1369, 
it is unnecessary for us to review its conclusion that 
liability could alternatively be based on 29 U.S.C.S 1362 
using the sham transfer doctrine. Accordingly, we do not 
rule on the merits of the District Court's application of the 
sham transfer doctrine to impose section 1362 liability.15 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will AFFIRM the District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Although section 1362 does not apply on its face to WCI because 
WCI was not a contributing sponsor when the BK plan was terminated, 
PBGC alleges, and the District Court held, that WCI should be held 
liable as a contributing sponsor under section 1362 because its transfer 
of the BK businesses to BKC should be disregarded as an economic 
"sham." WCI has not specifically challenged the application of the sham 
transfer doctrine to ERISA liability, but we note that there is a dearth 
of 
authority for extending the sham transfer doctrine to the ERISA context. 
In WCI 1, we discussed the sham transfer theory as if it could apply 
without specifically analyzing its applicability. We are not certain that 
the tax policy considerations at the heart of the sham transfer doctrine 
translate neatly when used to disregard a sale transaction for purposes 
of imposing pension liability. In addition, if we assume this doctrine 
does 
apply, we have some concern about the District Court's finding that the 
WCI-BKC transaction was a sham insofar as this ruling was based on 
the Court's assessment of WCI's subjective intent, notwithstanding its 
finding that the transaction had economic substance. Because we have 
affirmed the District Court's finding of WCI's liability on other grounds, 
however, we will refrain from delving into a full-fledged analysis and 
critique, leaving for another day the next step to be taken into the 
muddy waters of sham transfer jurisprudence. 
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Court's grant of judgment in favor of PBGC and against 
WCI on Count IV of PBGC's amended complaint. 
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